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Parliamentary Affairs Advance Access originally published online on September 14, 2007
Parliamentary Affairs 2007 60(4):709-715; doi:10.1093/pa/gsm043
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© The Author [2007]. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Hansard Society for Parliamentary Government; all rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org

The Eurogroup. How a Secretive Circle of Finance Ministers Shape European Economic Governance

Mark Glover

U. Puetter, The Eurogroup. How a Secretive Circle of Finance Ministers Shape European Economic Governance, Manchester University Press, 2006, ISBN: 07190-74037, pp. 208 , £55.

The first 150 words of the full text of this article appear below.


   Introduction
 
Suppose there exists a spectrum, ranging from complete transparency to complete secrecy, according to which it is possible to classify governments. Suppose also that there is a position on this spectrum that provides, if not an optimum for ‘good governance’, an acceptable balance between secrecy and transparency for advocates of both sides. The exact location of this compromise is currently being contested on all levels of government.

The arguments put forward by each side are well rehearsed, but not well dissected as a whole. Briefly, those who align themselves with decision-makers but who advocate openness support their stance by citing increased effectiveness as a result of public servants working under potential observation. The counter-arguments include the administrative burden of constant—or ‘process’—transparency, the temptation to pander to your constituency or hold the party line and, in economic policy-making, the effect on markets. Those who see themselves as guardians of democratic values—the . . . [Full Text of this Article]


   Talking about the weather
 

   Theoretical framework for informal governance?
 

   Evaluating informal governance?
 

   Conclusion
 

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